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Abstract: The foundations of forcing theory are reworked to streamline the presen-
tation and to show how the most basic results are applicable in very general contexts.
Introduction
After Cohen [Co] invented the method of forcing to settle long-open independence
results in set theory, techniques evolved to become simpler as well as more powerful. Our
focus is on simplifying foundational aspects of forcing, in its most elementary form, that
seem to have been relatively neglected. As will be seen, forcing becomes particularly easy
to understand when separated into distinct but interacting techniques, involving posets,
generic filters, Boolean algebras, and (for set theory) a weak form of the membership
relation. A new general-purpose forcing method, with a presumably much wider range
of applications, arises when aspects related to the construction of models for set theory
are stripped away and the role of names reexamined. Well-known complications involving
the set membership relation ∈ do not arise if methods requiring well-foundedness are
abandoned and simpler ones found. Although forcing models are studied via objects called
names, constructed in a standard way (with minor variations) from the poset, details
about names will turn out to be irrelevant in the earlier foundational stages studied below.
Could new ways of encoding names, with new relations and interpretations of them, yield
innovative applications of forcing in areas distant from set theory?
An overview of the most relevant aspects seems appropriate. Forcing has been re-
garded mainly as a method to construct models of set theory tailored to have a great
variety of properties, resolving purely set-theoretic questions such as those concerning pos-
sible values of powers of cardinals, or more ‘applied’ ones in areas that include infinite
combinatorics, topology, measure theory, and proof theory. Very briefly, one approach
starts with a fixed countable transitive model (M,∈) of ZFC which gives rise, noncon-
structively, to other more interesting models. It is convenient to work with such an M
but its existence is an unecessarily strong assumption, and several alternate approaches
are possible (e.g., see [Ku]). The most crucial aspect in applications is to define a poset,
often with great ingenuity, so that it ‘forces’ the new models obtained using it to have
the properties aimed at. These properties are discussed in a forcing language, using con-
stants intended to represent (nonfaithfully) names of the intended new sets. Statements
are interpreted in a way that depends on the choice, outside M , of a ‘generic’ filter in
the poset and on the form in which names are represented concretely as certain sets in
M . This approach already appears in mature form in Shoenfield [Sh], whose presentation
incorporated important simplifications. For historical details, see [Mo]. Since the basic
ideas of forcing lead to spectacular applications, some easily accessible, they deserve to be
made as simple and transparent as possible.
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Order-theoretic preliminaries
Order-theoretic concepts usually refer to the fixed poset (IP,≤), and variables such as
p, q, r range over the elements of IP. Notation X↑ = {p : (∃x ∈ X)(x ≤ p)} and X↓ is used
for up- and down-closures of subsets X of IP. Optionally, one can use topological concepts,
relative to the topology on IP formed by the down-closed sets. For example, a subset D is
dense if D↑ = IP.
Instead of working with arbitrary posets, one can use Boolean algebras. This permits
techniques of a more algebraic nature and more concise language. In practice, to construct a
model tailored to have certain properties, the preferred method is search for an appropriate
poset IP, which is then embedded into a complete Boolean algebra. One way is to start with
the unary operation which takes each subset X of IP to a down-closed set X ′ = IP\X↑. This
yields a closure operator X → X ′′ on IP, whose closed elements (X = X ′′) form a family,
here called IB(IP). As usual, the family is closed under arbitrary intersections, making it a
complete lattice. The lattice is complemented and is in fact a Boolean algebra, by a result
of Byrne [By], as it satisfies Byrne’s axioms: ∧ is a semilattice operation, 0 6= 0′, and,
most notably, X ∧ Y ′ = 0 iff X ∧ Y = X . Alternatively, IB(IP) consists of the regular open
sets of the above topology on IP.
In this paragraph, we make the mild assumption (separativity) that the sets p↓ (p ∈ IP)
lie in IB(IP). Then IP has a certain kind of universal embedding in a complete Boolean
algebra. One good source for relevant details is [Kub]. We remark that IP → IB(IP),
p 7→ p↓ is such an embedding. As this will not be needed, the details are omitted.
In conventional applications of forcing, the poset (IP,≤) lies within some model (M,∈)
for set theory, and those elements of IB(IP) that lie in M clearly form a subalgebra IBM (IP),
with sup and inf restricted to subfamilies definable in M . This relativization of IB(IP),
viewed within the model, is a complete Boolean algebra. Moreover, the forcing map (see
below) which takes a statement ϕ to {p ∈ IP : p  ϕ} will be seen to map into IBM (IP).
A filter G is a non-empty up-closed set for which each pair of elements of G has a lower
bound in G. The dense subsets of IP are clearly those of the form X ∪ X ′, and no filter
can contain points of both X and X ′. Relative to any collection D of dense subsets, there
is a notion of D-generic filters G, by which it is meant that G has non-empty intersection
with each D ∈ D. A well-known idea (see [Sh] or [Ku, VII, 2.3]) produces an abundance of
D-generic filters, enough so that each point p lies in such filters, whenever D is countable.
Abstract forcing
A forcing language will be taken here to be just a first-order language, say with relation
symbols but not terms, used to make statements involving constants called ‘names’, which
are used in place of free variables. The choice of basic symbols for logical conectives
and quantifiers (say ¬,∧, ∃) matters little in our classical approach. If desired, one could
rephrase results in terms of a version of the Lindenbaum algebra, regarded as the Boolean
algebra (with some extra structure) naturally induced on the statements of the forcing
language modulo logical equivalence.
Variables such as τ, σ, π always range over names, and may be quantified. The abstract
approach to names requires nothing more than a function from atomic statements ϕ to
values [[ϕ]] in the Boolean algebra IB(IP). In set-theoretical applications, the class of names
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and the relation p ∈ [[σ ∈ τ ]] should be definable by predicates in the base model (M,∈).
Extensionality of the new models is obtained by imposing a condition (E), treated below.
Any evaluation of atomic statements extends, in the obvious way, to one for all state-
ments in the language. In particular, [[(∃τ)ϕ(τ)]] is the sup in IB(IP) of the elements [[ϕ(τ)]]
as τ ranges over all names. Without assuming more about the structure of names, this
sup is not usually the union, which could be thought of as a defect when working with
individual points in IP. Generic filters provide the remedy.
The countable collection D used to define ‘generic’ matters little, so long as it contains
all X ∪X ′ for which X is either of the form [[ϕ]] or (letting one of the names used in ϕ
vary freely) of the form ∪τ [[ϕ(τ)]]. This restriction on D is essential for the next results,
but some class D more easily definable than the minimal one is customarily used. To
ensure that D is countable, the approach for set-theoretic applications makes the strong
assumption that M (viewed from outside) is countable, so that only a countable number
of dense subsets of IP are definable in M . In more general contexts, it would suffice to
assume at most enumerably many names and relation symbols (hence also statements).
For each generic filter G, consider the set TG of statements ϕ for which [[ϕ]] intersects
G nontrivially; i.e., (∃p ∈ G)(p ∈ [[ϕ]]). These ϕ are, in some sense ‘true relative to G’,
and we write G |= ϕ, while statements not in TG are ‘false for G’. This assignment of truth
values respects operations such as ∧,¬. To obtain models for TG, quantifiers must also be
respected. Handling ∃ yields at once the perhaps more surprising result for ∀.
Lemma: For statements ϕ(τ), with τ varying over names, and G a generic filter,
(a) G |= ∃τϕ(τ) iff for some τ , G |= ϕ(τ).
(b) G |= ∀τϕ(τ) iff for all τ , G |= ϕ(τ).
Proof: For this, it suffices to show that, given any family of statements of the form
ϕ(τ) with τ ranging over names, and letting X be the union of the corresponding subsets
[[ϕ(τ)]], then [[(∃τ)ϕ(τ)]] is disjoint from G if X is. This holds because here G must
contain some point of X ′, hence none in X ′′. This last set is just [[(∃τ)ϕ(τ)]].
It should not fail to be mentioned that, for names of the form used in set theory, part
(a) of the lemma can be strengthened to say that some suitable name τ depends only on ϕ,
not on G. See for example [Kub, Th. 9.2]. (The treatment in [Ku, VII, 8.2] is incomplete.)
Although statements ϕ are evaluated in the base model by using the Boolean algebra,
the usual aim is to use a generic filter G to construct a model M [G] with M [G] |= ϕ iff
G |= ϕ. Note that the previous lemma implies at once that the forcing language has such
a model: for now, M [G] will be taken to be the set N of names, endowed via the atomic
statements in TG with the relations corresponding to the relation symbols. Later, one may
prefer to factor out N by some equivalence relation, or use an appropriate image of N ,
in order to interpret more naturally symbols such as = (which should be equality) and ∈
(membership).
Each statement ϕ in the forcing language yields a forcing relation, say as a unary
relation on IP, as follows. For points p of IP, we say that p forces ϕ, and write p  ϕ, when
ϕ is true in every model M [G] with G generic (relative to D) and G p.
There are two especially fundamental results concering forcing. First, it is definable
in a way that does not mention generic filters: for each statement ϕ, some predicate in
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the base model determines which p ∈ IP force ϕ. The second, the Truth Lemma, is that
a statement ϕ is valid in a model M [G] exactly when some p in G forces ϕ. Another
perhaps noteworthy observation is that the forcing relation does not depend on the choice
(restricted as above) of the dense sets D used to define generic filters. All these results
follow immediately from:
Lemma: p  ϕ iff p ∈ [[ϕ]].
Proof: If p ∈ [[ϕ]] then, trivially, p  ϕ. Conversely, when p /∈ [[ϕ]] some q ≤ p lies in
[[ϕ]]′, and some generic filter G contains q. Now M [G] 6|= ϕ and p ∈ G, giving p 1 ϕ.
Interlude on non-extensional and non-well-founded theories
In theories and models, the symbol = is almost universally taken to mean equality.
Following a principle held by Leibniz, objects which cannot be distinguished by any relevant
property should be regarded as equal. The only reason not to identify would be to leave
open the possibility of later more refined properties. In models of set theory, or within
the language itself, = can be treated as being defined from the basic relation ∈, via an
even stronger principle, extensionality. This idea, that sets with the same members are
equal, seems so central to the concept of what sets are (platonically) that it has rarely been
examined critically. When ∈ is the only basic relation present, Leibniz extensionality, or
quasi-extensionality (with an equivalence relation in place of =) is:
(E) (∀π)(π ∈ σ1 ↔ π ∈ σ2)→ (∀τ)(σ1 ∈ τ ↔ σ2 ∈ τ).
However, set-theoretic forcing tends to produce even laxer models that need further adjust-
ments in order to satisfy (E). Another principle, that sets should be well-founded, is usually
imposed here, but this a rare example where such ideas only serve to complicate matters.
Now that there is sufficient motivation to examine non-extensionality, in conjunction with
non-well-foundedness, we take a broad view of related issues.
The area of mathematical foundations is rich with history and interesting issues,
enough to merit continuing scholarly attention. Attitudes to certain topics, for exam-
ple foundations for set theory, may change for reasons worth elucidating, detailing how
groups with different agenda, using different language, influence each other or fail to do so.
For example, it is extremely convenient to work with well-founded sets, using transfinite
induction on rank. This may explain in part why non-well-founded set theories remained
a little-studied curiosity in the shade of ZFC until there was a clear need for them, as
tools useful for studying several problems in computer science. For similar reasons, non-
extensionality (and intensionality) have in recent years become common topics in computer
science, whose influence may in time spread wider.
Despite earlier work in the field, notably by Boffa (in many articles), the use of non-
well-founded sets became commonplace thanks to the timely and influential work by Aczel
[A]. Not surprisingly, the sort of non-well-founded theories considered are overwhelmingly
those based on Aczel’s anti-foundation axiom AFA, which is too restrictive for our taste.
Our view is that if objects and a binary relation called ∈ are somehow given, and objects
with the same ‘members’ are equal, then this is a system of sets, as long as we do not need
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to examine objects internally (using more than ∈) to see what they are ‘really’ made of.
Does anyone ask what the empty set is made of? As in other areas of mathematics, only
abstract structural properties matter. Following Boffa rather than Aczel (and others), we
regard it as desirable to permit sets with different elements to have isomorphic internal
∈-structures, thereby for example allowing more than one set of the form x = {x}.
Many equivalent ways have been used to axiomatize the system known as ZF. The
exact form of the axioms becomes important when studying systems which omit or modify
axioms, and our attention is on Extensionality together with Foundation. One standard
source treating axioms for ZF and other set theories is [F], but it makes no claim to
completeness and mentions surprisingly little about the particular topics we wish to focus
on. For non-extensional theories, the following studies, whose reviews we consulted, seem
to be among the most mathematically relevant. Hinnion [Hi] introduces methods which,
among other things, simplify earlier work by Gandy [Ga], Scott [Sc], and others. Briefly,
the effects of omitting Extensionality are as follows. Scott showed that the resulting
system ZF 6= is distinctly weaker than ZF, while Gandy and H. Friedman [Fr] showed that
their systems suffer no significant change. The reason is that Scott and Gandy used the
usual form of Replacement, involving a functional relation of the form (∀x)(∃!y)ϕ(x, y),
but Gandy compensated for this weakness by introducing a set formation operator λxA(x)
(i.e., {x | A(x)}). The solution we prefer is Friedman’s, who used the Collection axiom (not
even mentioned in [F]), which strengthens Replacement when Foundation is not assumed.
Collection is: [(∀x)(∃y)ϕ(x, y)]→ [(∀X)(∃Y )(∀x ∈ X)(∃y ∈ Y )ϕ(x, y)]. A good exposition
of Friedman’s later improvements on [Fr] appears in [Kr, §5]. The conclusion is that, even
without Foundation, extensional systems can easily be recoved from non-extensional ones
of the right form.
Friedman’s solution is internal to the set theory (∈ can be defined from a weaker
non-extensional ε , assuming some set-theoretic axioms, but not Foundation), whereas
our solution assumes no axioms, but is carried out within the Boolean algebra rather
than within the forcing language. It can also be carried out internally in the presence of
axioms sufficient to support a definition by transfinite induction. While Friedman recovers
extensionality by identifying objects as much as possible, using an approach based on ideas
of Aczel, where the preferred bisimulations are maximal, we identify objects only when
absolutely necessary to obtain extensionality. The method is so simple that it may have
been rediscovered several times, but it does not seems to be widely known, as intensive
searches failed to locate a refererence in literature or reviews accessible to us. Aczel [A]
takes a different approach when studying the least bisimulation, a topic treated earlier by
Hinnion [Hi], presumably in a roughly similar way. However, the method we prefer can be
found in two recent preprints – [BMW, Prop. 6] and [Fi, §6]. In the second, the idea is
used in the process of making an interesting connection between forcing and modal logic.
The solution now given produces the smallest quasi-extensional relation ∈ (with an
equivalence relation in place of equality) generated from an arbitrary binary relation ε on
a set. The relation ∈ is well-founded precisely when ε is. The language will temporarily
have many binary relations: ∈, ε , ∼ and a family
α
∼, where α always ranges over ordinals.
For abstract forcing, the universe is the class of names, and only ordinals α < |IP| are
needed. For more general use, name-free notation will be used.
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To start,
0
∼ is equality, and y1
α+1
∼ y2 means (∀x1)(x1 ε y1 → (∃x2)(x1
α
∼ x2∧x2 ε y2))∧
(∀x2)(x2 ε y2 → (∃x1)(x1
α
∼ x2 ∧ x1 ε y1)). For limit ordinals λ,
λ
∼ is the limit (union) of
the earlier relations. It is not hard to see that the (
α
∼)α form an increasing family of
equivalence relations between names, and ∼ is defined to be its limit. Finally, x ∈ y is
defined to mean ∃x′(x ∼ x′ ∧ x′ ε y). It may be clearer to imagine the transition from ε
to ∈ in stages, defining x εα y iff there exist x′
α
∼ x and y′
α
∼ y with x′ ε y′. The earlier
extensionality condition (E) clearly holds. The equivalence relation ∼ (which is factored
out to form models with =) and the relation ∈, are definable in terms of each other, in the
presence of ε . Thus x ε y → x ∈ y and ε is a simulation for ∼, by which we mean that
x ε y ∧ y′ ∼ y → (∃x′ ∼ x)(x′ ε y′). This gives a clear idea how to construct all possible
ε from a quasi-extensional relation ∈ (with an equivalence relation ≡ in place of =), not
guaranteeing here that ≡ will be the smallest relation ∼ compatible with ε .
Forcing with names and Boolean-valued models
Returning to forcing, with the enriched language now using names, formulas will
be assigned values in a complete Boolean algebra IB, starting with atomic formulas and
extending in the obvious way. Everything is done within a model (M,∈) for set theory,
in ways definable by predicates in the forcing language, using a given valuation of ε on
the class of names, with values in the Boolean algebra IB = IBM (IP) constructed from a
fixed poset IP in the model. If M is countable, we can also concentrate on a model of the
forcing language obtained from a generic filter G. This initially gives a non-extensional
binary relation εG on the names, which generates a quasi-extensional relation ∈G in the
way described in the previous section. As well-foundedness is not assumed, it no longer
seems compelling to try to obtain quotient models (M [G],∈) that are standard.
The construction using Boolean valuations starts by defining [[τ1
0
∼ τ2]] to be 1 (the
set IP) if the names τ1 and τ2 are identical, and 0 (∅) otherwise. Whatever G is, this
just gives the equality relation on names. Other definitions are as expected. Thus, for
limit ordinals λ, [[τ
λ
∼ τ ′]] =
∨
α<λ
[[τ
α
∼ τ ′]]. Care is required here, as it is conceivable
that a generic filter G could be disjoint from the sets [[τ
α
∼ τ ′]] (α < λ) but not from
[[τ
λ
∼ τ ′]]. In set-theoretic models, assuming enough axioms to allow quantification over
ordinals, an earlier lemma shows that this problem does not arise. In general, a suitable
relation ∼, no longer claimed to be the smallest one, will be produced. This follows from
[[τ
λ
∼ τ ′]] =
∨
α<λ
[[τ
α
∼ τ ′]] ≤ [[σ ε τ → (∃σ′ ε τ ′)(σ
λ
∼ σ′)]].
Set-theoretic axioms are usually stated in terms of ∈, but stronger forms using ε
may be more convenient. The axioms of ZFC are especially well-suited for constructing
models that satisfy enough of the axioms (a finite number) to be useful. Names and
Boolean valuations can be built in transfinite stages from initial data, in ways ensuring
that these axioms then hold in the models (M [G],∈G). Now that problems concerning non-
extensionality and non-well-foundedness have been adequately resolved, remaining details
can be inferred from many sources. Only a little will be sketched here.
To construct names of one of the conventional forms, one can start with N0 = ∅ (say),
define Nα+1 to be the union of Nα with the set of functions Nα → IB that lie in M , and
let Nλ (λ a limit ordinal) be the obvious union. Thus each name is ‘created’ at a successor
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ordinal in M . For names σ, τ , the value [[σ ε τ ]] is defined to be τ(σ) if σ is created before
τ , and is 0 otherwise.
As an illustration, the power set axiom will be examined. Write σ′ ≤ σ if, for all
names π, [[π ε σ′]] ≤ [[π ε σ]]. This provides a sufficiently large supply of names for subsets.
Given σ ∈ Nα one name τ : Nα → IB with [[∀σ′(σ′ ∈ τ ↔ σ′ ⊂ σ)]] = 1 is as follows: for
all σ′ ∈ Nα, τ(σ′) = 1 ∈ IB when σ′ ≤ σ, while τ(σ′) = 0 otherwise.
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